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AN ALTERNATIVE 
METHODOLOGY FOR 
THE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC 
ARTEFACTS
Abstract: ! is article proposes that 
thinking of scienti" c instruments
as playthings or philosophical toys
o# ers a  method for looking at the
ways in which we learn from made
things and from the act of making in
investigating the world. Rather than
approaching artefacts as stable ob-
jects, de" nable and categorisable in
terms of their function, this method 
puts forward the instability and 
mobility of artefacts on several levels:
in terms of their movements between
hands, social contexts and systems of 
knowledge, in terms of their physical 
articulations and of their changing 
functions, and in terms of the % ows
and processes of materials at work
within and through them.
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alternativní metodologie 
výzkumu vědeckých 
artefaktů
Abstrakt: Uvažovat o vědeckých pří-
strojích jako hračkách či " loso" ckých 
hračkách nabízí speci" ckou metodu 
zkoumání způsobů, jimiž se z vytvo-
řených věcí i způsobů jejich vytváření 
učíme při zkoumání světa. Nepřistu-
puje k artefaktům jako ke stabilním 
předmětům, de" novatelným a  kla-
si" kovatelným na  základě jejich 
funkce, nýbrž zdůrazňuje nestabilitu 
a  mobilitu artefaktů na  několika 
rovinách: jejich pohybu mezi ru-
kama, sociálními kontexty a systémy 
vědění; jejich fyzické artikulace 
a  proměn funkcí těchto artikulací; 
materiálních procesů působících 
v nich i jejich prostřednictvím.
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I  begin this article by elaborating an understanding of playthings from 
multi-disciplinary perspectives that consider their role in the reciprocal 
constitution of self and world. I then explain how the resistant malleability 
of playthings, their participation in the explorative and expansive play of 
thought and the attention to technology and materials during play lead 
a consideration of scienti" c instruments into the realm of playthings. I use 
this to argue that regarding instruments as playthings allows for an ecologi-
cal approach to artefacts that is more concerned with (embodied) compre-
hension than knowledge and that takes into account their varying roles and 
meanings. # is allows me to introduce the notion of ‘historical a$ ordance’ 
to relate the evolution in what an instrument o$ ers to perception, action 
and understanding. I " nally % esh out this methodology and apply it to the 
Crookes radiometer as a case study to demonstrate how thinking of instru-
ments as playthings o$ ers scope for ‘tuning in’ to them.
Playthings
In his 1987 presidential address on “Scienti" c Toys”, science historian 
Gerard L’Estrange Turner describes the importance of homo ludens when
“considering how human beings acquire knowledge”.1
# e way in which yesterday’s science so o& en becomes today’s recreation does 
not make it any less scienti" c. Indeed, much scienti" c, and other, knowledge is 
absorbed consciously or unconsciously through play.2
Turner’s argument is that learning through play has always been essential 
to “discovering how the natural world works”, which is to say scienti" c 
understanding, and he illustrates this through an overview of philosophi-
cal apparatus and demonstration instruments from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century that passed into recreational use in the 19th century and
became toys in the twentieth.
In “Cognitive Objects”, psychologist Robin A. Hodgkin, similarly 
concerned with the relationship between scienti" c discovery and play,
tries to work out the nature of this connection.3 Building on Jean Piaget’s
1 Gerard L’Estrange TURNER, “Presidential Address: ‘Scienti" c Toys’.” British Journal for the 
History of Science, vol. 20, 1987, p. 377 (377–398).
2 TURNER, “Scienti" c Toys,” p. 384.
3  Robin A. HODGKIN, “Cognitive Objects.” Oxford Review of Education, vol. 14, 1988, no. 
3 (353–362). See also Robin A. HODGKIN, “Making Space for Meaning.” Polanyiana, vol. 6, 
1997, no. 2 (55–71).
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framework in developmental psychology and Seymour Papert’s theories of 
cognitive science, he argues that “the key questions” in order to understand 
this connection
[...] are not to do with a child’s exposure to mechanical ideas in toys, but rather 
with the many-sidedness and depth of his own involvement in play. Here is the 
seed bed not only of active science but also of technical cra"  skills.4
! e looping structure of play
Hodgkin describes a semi-cyclical and recurrent process of creativity that 
he visualises as “a  looping structure originating in play”, which he also 
uses to show the way in which a plaything oscillates between being toy, tool 
and symbol; its nature changing as a result of the alternating possibilities 
of progressing by skill-developing practice on one hand or of proceeding 
by exploratory “groping and experimenting movements” on the other.5 His 
contention is that this cycle is common to all processes of discovery, and 
that the “cognitive object” or “generative thing-idea” that it involves acts 
as a “transitional object”.6 # is term was introduced by psychologist D. W. 
Winnicott to refer to a child’s $ rst “not-me” possession, which, he contends, 
enables a mediation between the child’s inner and outer world through in-
habiting “an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and 
external life both contribute”, that is by being part of both the subjective and 
what is objectively perceived.7 Such objects, according to Winnicott, exem-
plify the ways in which humans negotiate their relation to the world: their 
task is to keep inner and outer reality separate but interrelated.8 Describing 
archetypes of interaction with “transitional objects” in Playing and Reality, 
he further suggests that “thinking, or fantasying, gets linked up with these 
functional experiences”.9 # is is the insight that Hodgkin picks up on in his 
4 HODGKIN, “Cognitive Objects”, p.356. It is important to note that while Hodgkin picks up 
on the revaluation of concrete reasoning in Piaget, he does not cast it, as the latter does, as an 
inferior stage in the progression towards formal or abstract thinking: for Hodgkin the two 
modes of thinking always alternate and, moreover, concrete objects play a signi$ cant part in 
both.
5 Ibid., p. 357.
6 Ibid., p. 359.
7 Donald W. WINNICOTT, Playing and Reality. London – New York: Routledge 2008, p. 3.
8 # is also explains how the prospect of the loss of an object is always a part of the love one 
has for it.
9  WINNICOTT, Playing and Reality, p. 5.
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text when he speaks of the “many-sidedness and depth” of involvement in 
play. Playthings move between the status of tool and symbol, which means 
that, like transitional objects, they are both sensory and abstract. Playing 
with things is fundamentally a mediating between material existence and 
mental operations, a form of search that is essential to science, technology 
and cra" .
While I generally agree with this statement, my concern here is not with 
the broad relationship between play and science. What I would like to draw 
on instead are aspects of Hodgkin’s description of playthings, which, I will 
argue, o# er a useful tool for thinking of scienti$ c artefacts in a way that 
takes into account, amongst other things, their varying roles and meanings 
in a  phenomenological/ecological framework. Playthings are objects for 
thought and action that change their ‘nature’ in a looping movement, which 
paradoxically both results from and enables a  reciprocal and constitutive
interaction between self and world. A plaything, rather than being de$ ned 
by a function, embraces varying roles, switches in the categories that it be-
longs to and is even prone to changes in what constitutes it, all the while still 
remaining, in some sense, itself. How does this varying invariance operate? 
What kind of understanding does it present? What kind of engagement does 
it require? How does it involve the thing that it puts into play?
Familiar and poetic substance
In a short essay on “Toys” in his Mythologies, literary theorist Roland Barthes 
laments complicated “French toys” with which a child can only engage as 
a user or owner, and opposes them to simple playthings, such a set of blocks, 
which provide “a very di# erent kind of learning”. 10 With these “unre$ ned” 
playthings,
[...] the child does not in any way create meaningful objects, it matters little to 
him whether they have an adult name; the actions he performs are not those 
of a user but those of a demiurge. He creates forms which walk, which roll, he 
creates life, not property: objects now act by themselves, they are no longer an 
inert and complicated material in his hand.11
10  Roland BARTHES, “Toys.” In: Roland BARTHES, Mythologies. Translated by Annette 
Lavers. London: Vintage 2000, p. 54 (53–55).
11 Ibid., p. 54.
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In describing playthings coming to life in this way, Barthes is not implying 
an animistic understanding of toys, but rather identifying a particular kind 
of contact with the world – one that they o" er in the shape of an object 
which both yields to the player’s desires and whims and at the same time 
informs them. # ese playthings provide what he describes as “a  familiar 
and poetic substance”, something simple that can be deployed intricately 
and that keeps child and environment in close contact.12 When built using
“an ideal material”, such as wood for instance, they “can last a  long time, 
live with the child, alter little by little the relations between the object and 
hand”.13 It is an attentive and caring relationship that evokes the emotional 
attachment to “transitional objects” and that likewise develops a sensitive 
and enquiring approach to the world. It is moreover an immersive expe-
rience that understands the need for taking one’s time, for putting time 
into things. # e movement it entails, as Hodgkin has suggested, is a  loop 
rather than a straight line: its objective is not to complete a  journey or to 
get somewhere, but rather to cover as much space as it can while retracing 
itself, to spread out. It is, in that sense, spatial, whence both Hodgkin and 
Winnicott’s reference to an intermediate space or privileged zone of play. 
Like the loop, it recursively goes back and forth without crossing over itself, 
is concerned with versatility rather than economy and has for principle an 
extension of possibilities, a spread in testing them out. # e actions it involves 
are “those of a demiurge”, because they are a kind of composition, a creative 
act that plays out the di" erent possibilities of the thing put into play. Playing 
with a thing is a playing out of its a" ordances, and the ideal plaything o" ers 
a wide range of a" ordance, has a lot of “play”.
! inking things
In “A Philosophy of Fidgets”, cultural theorist Steven Connor re$ ects on 
the things that seem to call for such looping actions and suggests that they 
might embody thinking, make it palpable:
# e deeper secret of these objects is perhaps that they are the necessary acces-
sories to thought. Perhaps they are forms of thought themselves. [...] It is as 
though we were compelled to act out literally the meaning of the word ‘re$ ec-
tion’, from re-! ectare to bend back on oneself. Just as we recruit our own bodies
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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for these doubling enactments of our own re! ective work, so we requisition 
objects to join the ! exing play of thought.14
Connor describes such playthings as “accentuating rather than accelerating 
devices”, as instruments “for pervading rather than progress”.15 " ey are
necessary for thought because they give shape to the operations of thinking, 
they o# er thinking an external object with which to think of itself. " ey 
are what he calls ‘thinking things’, “the kinds of thing that draw, drain and 
detain our thinking, and that make thinking accessible as a kind of thing”:16
[T]hinking as an adjectival participle and thinking as the name of an action 
– thus ‘things that are thinking’ and ‘thinking about things’. [...] So thinking 
things constitute a  surrogate way of thinking about the things that thinking 
takes to itself in order to think about the way it thinks about things…17
“" inking things” are the things with which we interrogate both the 
world and our thinking about the world, they are the things of, through and 
in which we think the world. Playthings are what we think of in the absorp-
tion and intent that playing with them requires. " ey are what we think 
through when we enrol them in our exploratory activities. " ey are what we 
think within when they come to stand for the thinking about the world that
is thought through them as an extension of us into the world and of them as 
a part of the world exterior to us. " e plaything, then, shares its play loop 
with “the ! exing play of thought”: both join in this ! ickering between thing 
and thought, between object and subject, that reciprocally constitutes them 
both.18
14  Steven CONNOR, A Philosophy of Fidgets [online], talk given at the Liverpool Biennial
Touched Talks, 17 Feb 2010. 2010. Available at: <http://www.stevenconnor.com/% dgets/> [cit. 
15. 7. 2013], p. 3.
15 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
16 Steven CONNOR, " inking " ings [online], plenary lecture given at ESSE-9, the 9th annual
conference of the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE), Aarhus, Denmark, 
25 August 2008 and as the Textual Practice lecture, University of Sussex, 14 October 2009. 
2008–2009. Available at: <http://www.stevenconnor.com/thinkingthings/> [cit. 15. 7. 2013], 
p. 4.
17 Ibid., p. 22.
18  CONNOR, “A Philosophy of Fidgets,” p. 3.
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Evocative objects
! is reciprocal constitution of subject and object in play is what motivates 
essayist Walter Benjamin to call for a “philosophical classi# cation of toys” 
that would “penetrate to the reality [and] to the conceptual understanding 
of toys” in several essays on playthings and on “the mysteries of the world of 
play” into which they lead:19
We experiment early on with basic rhythms that proclaim themselves in their 
simplest forms in these sorts of games with inanimate objects. Or rather, these 
are the rhythms in which we # rst gain possession of ourselves.20
Playthings are what sociologist of science Sherry Turkle calls “evoca-
tive objects” to emphasise “the inseparability of thought and feeling in our 
relationship to things”. As she puts it, “[w]e think with the objects we love; 
we love the objects we think with”.21 As both a$ ective companions and 
“provocations to thought”, playthings are at the origin of the “basic rhythms” 
through which our emotional and intellectual lives are composed.22 ! e 
question then is: how does this work? What makes playthings evocative?
In “! e Cultural History of Toys”, Benjamin cautions against the com-
mon “assumption that the imaginative content of a  child’s toys is what 
determines his playing; whereas in reality the opposite is true.”23
A child wants to pull something, and so he becomes a horse; he wants to play 
with sand, and so he turns into a baker; he wants to hide, and so he turns into 
a robber or policeman.24
Here are again the “actions of a demiurge”, the creative acts that put things 
into play; but Benjamin’s description reveals an additional and important 
aspect of this enrolling of things: it is speci# c to what each thing o$ ers to be 
19 Walter BENJAMIN, “! e Cultural History of Toys.” In: JENNINGS, M. W. – BULLOCK, 
M. – EILAND, H. – SMITH, G. (eds.), Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol.2, Part 2, 
1927-1930. Cambridge – London, Belknap Press 2005, pp. 115–116 (113–116). See also Walter 
BENJAMIN, “Old Toys: ! e Toy Exhibition at the Märkisches Museum.” In: Walter Benjamin: 
Selected Writings, pp. 98–112.
20 Walter BENJAMIN, “Toys and Play: Marginal Notes on a Monumental Work.” In: Walter 
Benjamin Selected Writings, p. 120 (117–121).
21  Sherry TURKLE, “Introduction: ! e ! ings ! at Matter.” In: TURKLE, S. (ed.), Evocative
Objects: ! ings We ! ink With. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007, p. 5 (3–10).
22 Ibid.
23  BENJAMIN, “! e Cultural History Of Toys,” p. 115.
24 Ibid., p. 115.
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done with it, to its a! ordance. " e child does indeed determine the imagina-
tive content of a plaything, but she does so in recognition of and in reaction 
to the possibilities for action that the plaything presents to her. A toy carriage 
is pull-able, and in pulling it the child may imagine herself a horse drawing 
the carriage; sand can be wet into doughy mud and be kneaded, allowing the 
child to impersonate a baker; but it can also be poured and have her picture 
herself an hourglass, or be used to build sandcastles making her a kind of 
architect. It cannot, however, be pulled, or tied, or folded. " e imaginative 
content of playthings is determined by the child but, it also always results of 
the a! ordances of the thing for the child: it is part of a particular moment 
or circumstance and is linked to a desire or query, to something someone 
wants to do that it presents itself as useful for. " is can range from wanting 
“to pull something”, through testing what can be done something and what 
purposes it can serve, to looking to represent something, or most typically 
an intermingled combination of several of these.
Ecology and the theory of a! ordance
" e way in which the perception of things is situated and they way in which 
they are apprehended as possibility for action are the founding principles 
of James J. Gibson’s ecological approach to perception and of his theory of 
a! ordance that the methodology I am proposing builds on. In Ecological Ap-
proach to Visual Perception, Gibson introduces his ecological understanding
of the environment as what a! ords animate life, that is, as what supports 
perception and behaviour, which are in turn reciprocally related to the eco-
system.25 He explains his understanding of ecological reality thus:
" e world of physical reality does not consist of meaningful things. " e world 
of ecological reality, as I have been trying to describe it, does. If what we per-
ceived were the entities of physics and mathematics, meanings would have to 
be imposed on them. But if what we perceive are the entities of environmental 
science, their meanings can be discovered.26
Gibson’s ecological theory describes things in terms of their organism-
indexed signi$ cance in relation to living forms as well as in terms of their 
ecological (shared) objectivity, both of which are understood to be in dis-
25  James J. GIBSON, ! e Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. New Jersey – London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1979.
26 Ibid., p. 33.
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continuous and reciprocal (animal-environment) change. Based on this 
understanding, he elaborates the theory of “a! ordances”, a  term he uses 
to describes “what [the environment] o! ers animals, what it provides or 
furnishes, for good or ill”, that is, any opportunity or danger within an 
organism’s environment.27 He further insists that an a! ordance is neither
a subjective nor an objective property or “could be both” and that it “points 
both ways, to the environment and to the observer”.28 # ings, then, have 
a! ordances de$ ned by the possibilities for action on a particular environ-
ment. # is can be thought of as “-ables’ as in “movable”,  “see-through-able”, 
“touchable”, “smell-able”, “sit-upon-able etc”. 29 A! ordances are, moreover,
perceived in relation to the organism in question: di! erent things a! ord dif-
ferent meanings and actions to di! erent organisms.30 Gibson $ nally notes 
that, rather than qualities or properties say, a! ordances are always what we 
$ rst pay attention to in things.31
Following Gibson’s ecological framework, a! ordances, availability, ac-
cess and the particulars of a given situation play an essential part in the enrol-
ment of a thing in enquiring play. It nevertheless seems that some objects are 
more evocative than others, that some things are better at leading into “real 
living play”.32 So what then has the a! ordance of an ideal plaything? What 
possesses the resistant malleability required for the exploratory looping of 
play? What constitutes, in Barthes’ words, a “familiar poetic substance” and 
is that demanded from a plaything?
Clarity of materials and technology
Like Barthes, Benjamin bemoans complex toys and those “based on imi-
tation”, which he says lead away from authentic playthings and from “real 
27  James J. GIBSON, “# e # eory of A! ordances.” In: SHAW, R. – BRAUSFORD, J. (eds.), 
Perceiving, Acting and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology. New York – Toronto – 
London – Sydney: John Wiley & Sons 1977, p. 68 (67–82).
28  GIBSON,! e Ecological Approach, p. 129.
29 M. T. TURVEY, “Perception: # e Ecological Approach.” In: NADEL, L. (ed.) Encyclopedia
of Cognitive Science. London: Nature Publishing Group 2002, p. 540 (538–541). See also dra%  
article Claudia CARELLO and M. T. TURVEY,! e Ecological Approach to Perception [online].
Available at: <ione.psy.uconn.edu/~corr/EncCogSci.pdf> [cit. 14. 8. 2013]. 
30  GIBSON, “# e # eory of A! ordances,” p. 79.
31  GIBSON,! e Ecological Approach, p. 75.
32 BENJAMIN, “# e Cultural History of Toys,” p. 116.
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living play”.33 Noting how “chaste” children are in their use of materials
and how interested they are in the construction and modi! cation of toys in 
play, he proposes that a “particular clarity” is required that makes genuine 
playthings:34
In the case of toys simplicity is to be found not in their shapes but in the 
transparent nature of the manufacturing process. Hence, it cannot be judged 
according to an abstract canon but di# ers in di# erent places, and is less a matter 
of formal criteria, because a number of methods of processing – carving, in 
particular – can give free rein to their imagination without becoming in the 
least incomprehensible. In the same way, the genuine and self-evident simplic-
ity of toys was a matter of technology not formalist consideration.35
Benjamin, like Barthes, insists that: “however uni! ed and unambiguous the 
material is, the more it seems to embrace the possibility of a multitude of 
! gures of the most varied sort”.36 But he suggests that the required simplicity 
is not only to be found in an object’s material composition: technological 
transparency is also essential. Structure and operation must, like materi-
als, be accessible and intimately grasped in order for them to be e# ectively 
deployed. It is the clarity of the processes at work in an object that determine 
its simplicity and its consequent creative potential both practically and al-
legorically. In the same way that we can only use words to their full poetic 
or theoretical potential once we’ve become familiar with the way they work, 
so can we only put artefacts maximally to play when their technology is 
“self-evident” to us.
Benjamin, also like Barthes, seems to be giving primacy to wood as 
a material, but his reason for that is not something to do with an inherent 
quality of the substance: it is rather to do with the “methods of processing” 
that it lends itself to, the particular comprehensibility of carving as a method 
of making. A genuine plaything necessitates an intimate understanding of 
its inner workings by the person engaging with it. While it is easy for most 
people to agree with Benjamin that carving is in that sense particularly easy 
to understand, perhaps we should keep in mind that comprehension is in 
the eye of the beholder. A technology that seems alien to a person might be 
33 Ibid., pp.115–6. He writes that “imitation [...] is at home in the playing, not in the plaything,” 
p. 116.
34  BENJAMIN, “Toys and Play,” p. 119.
35 Ibid., p.119.
36  BENJAMIN, “$ e Cultural History of Toys,” p. 115.
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another’s favoured plaything; a medium that seems opaque to a person could 
open up a world of possibilities to another.
Skill
" is account of playthings puts forward the way in which making things 
and interacting with them are interrelated rather than opposed practices, 
and the fact that both are based on an attentive engagement of human beings 
with elements of their environment.
Artefacts are made things and should be thought of as the outcome of 
the skilful engagement of a maker with elements from his or her environ-
ment. In a  chapter from ! e Perception of the Environment in which he
discusses skill and the construction of artefacts, anthropologist Tim Ingold 
insists on the importance of doing away with the modern dichotomy be-
tween art and technology that separates made things in terms of oppositions 
between mental/material or semiotics/mechanics, and presents the notion 
of “skill” as a solution to this split.37 To describe what he means by “skill”, 
Ingold articulates # ve critical dimensions of skilled practice: the # rst is that 
intentionality and functionality are immanent in it as a synergetic process 
involving humans, tools and materials rather than being an attribute of one 
or the other; the second is that it is an ecologically embedded system of rela-
tions between the body and the environment; the third is that it is grounded 
in an attentive perceptual involvement with things requiring care and a hap-
tic dexterity based on a “continual adjustment or “tuning” of movements in 
response to an ongoing monitoring of the emergent task”; the fourth is that 
it is handed down practically “by introducing novices into contexts which 
a$ ord selected opportunities for perception and action, and by providing 
the sca$ olding that enables them to make use of these a$ ordances”; the # % h, 
related to Ingold’s claim that “what we call ‘things’ too are grown”, is that 
skilled practice precedes design in generating the form of artefacts.38
I think that by describing “the transparent nature of the manufacturing 
process” that makes for an ideal plaything, Benjamin is referring to artefacts 
37 Tim INGOLD, ! e Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 
London: Taylor & Francis Inc. 2000.
38  INGOLD, ! e Perception of the Environment, p. 345; p. 345; p. 83. See also Tim INGOLD,
“Making Culture and Weaving the World.” In: GRAVES-BROWN, P.  M.  (ed.) Matter,
Materiality and Modern Culture. London – New York: Routledge 2000 (50–71) where he
argues we should think of making “as a modality of weaving” [p. 54], meaning that in making 
“we work from within the world, not upon it” [p. 68].
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where the ! ve dimensions of skill articulated by Ingold are visible, that is 
objects that clearly present the a" ordances involved in making them as an 
essential part of those o" ered in interacting with them – this is the “clarity” 
that makes something a thing for “real living play”.
As components of an ecological environment that unfolds, rather 
than of a physical/material world that just is, these properties of things, as 
Ingold puts it, “occur”, meaning that they are “processual and relational”, 
that they are “neither objectively determined nor subjectively imagined, but 
practically experienced”.39 As such, they emerge through a reciprocal and
changing engagement between being and environment, which is what leads 
Ingold to the conclusion that “[t]he properties of materials, in short, are not 
attributes, but histories”.40
Destruction
I will elaborate on the necessity of a historical dimension when considering 
instruments as playthings when I $ esh out the principles of the methodol-
ogy that I am proposing below. Before that however, I would like to address 
another aspect of the investigative tendency in play that is less concerned 
with arrangement and composition, a way at getting to the inner workings 
of a thing in which testing its a" ordances is pushed to its extreme, where the 
object is taken to its limit – its destruction. As Connor writes,
perhaps all play has at its horizon the death of the plaything. When we put 
something to work, we use it for a particular purpose. In play, we seek not so 
much to use them as to use them up. % e point of putting things into play may be 
to play them out, to see how far they go, how far we can go with the open totality 
of their a" ordances.41
In “A Philosophy of Toys”, the poet and essayist Charles Baudelaire, 
examining the role of playthings “in the great drama of life”, considers the 
tendency to take them apart.42 Like Barthes and Benjamin, he begins his 
essay by describing the genial a" ordance of things in play, citing the example 
39  Tim INGOLD, “Materials against Materiality.” In: Tim INGOLD, Being Alive: Essays on 
Movement, Knowledge and Description. Oxon – New York: Routledge 2011, p. 30 (19–32).
40 Ibid., p. 32.
41 CONNOR, “A Philosophy of Fidgets,” p. 3.
42 Charles BAUDELAIRE, “A Philosophy of Toys.” In: Charles BAUDELAIRE, ! e Painter 
of Modern Life and other Essays. Translated by Jonathan Mayne. London: Phaidon Press 
1964, p. 198 (197–203). For further examples of the a" ordance of playthings see also Charles 
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of a simple chair that becomes at once carriage, horses and passengers in 
a game of diligence.43 Baudelaire also underlines the creativity involved in 
such play, the “poetry of childhood” that unfolds when engaging with “these 
little inventions”.44 " is even has him place playthings at the origin of aes-
thetic sensibility: “the toy”, he writes, “is the child’s # rst initiation to art”.45
However, for Baudelaire, the “overriding desire” when putting things to 
play, the principal a$ ordance of playthings, is the opportunity to dismantle 
them, to dissect them, to break them open in order to “get at and see [their] 
soul”.46 He illustrates this testing of a plaything to destruction, and the “ex-
traordinary agility and strength” applied at it:
" e child twists and turns his toy, scratches it, shakes it, bumps it against 
the walls, throws it on the ground. From time to time he makes it re-start its 
mechanical motions, sometimes in the opposite direction. Its marvellous life 
comes to a stop. " e child, like the people besieging the Tuileries, makes a su-
preme e$ ort; at last he opens it up, he is stronger. But where is the soul? " is is 
the beginning of melancholy and gloom.47
Baudelaire sees in this impulse to play things out “a # rst metaphysical ten-
dency”, a search concerned with the nature of existence for, as he put it at the 
text’s opening, “is not the whole life to be found [in playthings]?”48 While 
the answer to this at # rst seemed a%  rmative, it now appears to be “no”. Or 
perhaps Baudelaire is suggesting that things are not that simple, that in 
a sense all of life it is in playthings yet at the same time not really there at all.
Allegorical objects
It is this paradox that literary theorist Daniel Ti$ any picks up on in Toy Me-
dium in which he describes the ambivalent matter of playthings, how they 
are always more and less than what they take themselves to be.49 He points
BAUDELAIRE, “" e Plaything of the Poor.” In: SMITH, T. R.  (ed.) Baudelaire: His Prose and 
Poetry. New York: Boni & Liveright Inc. 1919 (70–71).
43 Ibid., pp. 198–199.
44 Ibid,. p. 200.
45 Ibid,. p. 199.
46 Ibid,. p. 202.
47 Ibid,. pp. 202–203.
48 Ibid,. p. 202.
49 Daniel TIFFANY, Toy Medium: Materialism and Modern Lyric. Berkley: University of 
California Press 2000.
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out how the plaything in Baudelaire’s text is “antithetical, at once philosophi-
cal and inimical to re! ection, ideal and concrete”.50 " e impulse to open up
the plaything in the destructive narrative above is in fact evidence of the 
“metaphysical” world that it represents for the child, the idea of “material 
things founded on the immateriality of ‘the soul’ – the allegorical object, 
in e# ect”.51 Rather than the “melancholy and gloom” that the spleen-ridden 
Baudelaire sees in the failure at $ nding a soul in the plaything, Ti# any argues 
that it registers the beginning of allegorical thinking: playthings are our $ rst 
models for our understanding of the world, they are exemplary of the objects 
we use as structural substitutes in natural philosophical investigations to 
make the intangible tangible. As Ti# any puts it,
Inquiries into the nature of material substance rely fundamentally on images 
that do not bear witness to empirical entities, but rather serve as models of 
unobservable phenomena. Indeed, the realism of modern physics (in contrast
to its mathematical foundation) relies, by necessity, on a  framework of vivid 
analogies and tropes, sometimes realized in visual practice. " at is to say, the 
foundation of material substance is intelligible to us, and therefore appears to 
be real, only if we credit the imaginary pictures we have composed of it.52
Ti# any’s book is concerned with how poetry “can help to elucidate the 
sometimes paradoxical bodies conjured by scienti$ c materialism”; and an 
exploration of playthings winds through his inquiry because the toy, he ar-
gues, is the fundamental manifestation of the paradoxical thing suspended 
between matter and immateriality,  “a spectacular device that discloses, in 
the name of science, the immaterial foundation of the object – the invisibility 
of the real”.53 In his narrative, playthings represent the “hypothetical model-
ling of invisible matter”, which leads him to write that “[t]he toy divines the 
invisible substance of things”.54
When breaking the plaything open to look for its interior mechanism 
and $ nding no “soul” in it, we learn that our natural investigations can only 
yield an imagined interior of things; which is why the plaything, as well as 
being an abbreviation of the whole world, is the perfect symbol of the meth-
ods with which we investigate the world. Perhaps this is the reasoning that 
50  TIFFANY, Toy Medium, p. 307, note 21.
51 Ibid,. p. 73.
52 Ibid,. p. 3.
53 Ibid,. p. 6; p. 82.
54 Ibid,. p. 52.
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has Benjamin conclude his article by saying: “If a modern poet maintains 
that for each individual there exists an image which engulfs the world, how 
o" en does that image not arise from an old toy chest?”55
Even testing playthings to their destruction is in a sense constructive 
to understanding: when they break, playthings simply go from being things 
with which we understand the world to becoming things with we under-
stand our ways of understanding the world with things – “thinking things” 
with which we interrogate our thinking about the world.
But breaking playthings open is also practically useful in the quest to 
understanding them as artefacts, as made things: it reveals how they are 
constituted, not only in terms of material parts, but also, as Benjamin sug-
gests, in terms of the technologies that form them and make them work, 
which it to say, as Ingold shows, the di# erent dimensions of skill involved 
in their making, the combined movements of people, materials and tools 
that bring them to be. When a thing stops to work or is broken open, these 
movements are made visible through the formation of an understanding of 
what causes the thing to fail or break. In this sense, breaking a plaything is 
only part of putting it to play with all the search and learning that such play 
involves.
Playthings methodology
$ e methodology I am proposing is concerned with the material culture of 
natural philosophy and science, speci% cally with the ways in which we learn 
from made things and from the act of making in investigating the world. 
Rather than the “knowledge” we get from instruments, with all the episte-
mological baggage of truth, justi% cation and objectivity that the term entails, 
it addresses something closer to the word “comprehension” which % nds its 
Latin etymological root (comprehend-ĕre) in the act of grasping at some-
thing before actually seizing or comprising it, and the word “understanding” 
with its source in the German for “to step under” (understân) or “to take
upon oneself” (unterstehen), with the embodied engagement with the world
55  $ is quote is from Benjamin’s “Toys and Play” referenced above, but I am using here Ti# any’s 
translation in Toy Medium [p. 81] which, by using the word “engulf” to translate from the
German “versinkt”, I % nd closer to the original text: “Wenn aber ein moderner Dichter sagt, 
es gebe für jeden ein Bild, über dem die ganze Welt ihm versinkt, wie vielen steigt es nicht aus 
einer alten Spielzeugschachtel auf?” from Walter BENJAMIN, “Spielzeug und Spielen.” In: 
TIEDEMANN-BARTELS, H. (ed.) Gesammelte Schri" en, vol. 3. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag
1972, p. 131.
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that such actions would involve.56 My suggestion is that regarding scienti! c
instruments as playthings would allow for a multi-faceted approach to their 
role in the co-constitution of human perception and understanding of the 
world.
Following the elaboration on playthings above, let us go through the 
ways in which the analogy is fruitful for these aims by applying them to the 
Crookes radiometer as a case study.
! e Crookes radiometer
# e most common form for a Crookes radiometer (or light-mill) consists of 
a glass bulb of about 10 cm in diameter, mounted on a stand. It is partially 
evacuated and contains an anemometer-like structure of four vanes pivoted 
on a vertical axis. # ese vanes are usually white on one side and black on the 
other, and all face the same way. When the instrument is exposed to light, 
this “$ y” rotates with the white sides leading, its spin intensifying with the 
length of exposure, and slowing down then stopping when the light source 
is taken away.57
In an article published on the centennial of the instrument’s inception, 
historian Cli% on W. Draper makes a  case for the importance in science 
education of the device that has “fallen to the unprestigious role of a gi%  
shop knickknack”.58 Besides the fact that its theory “is today still only quali-
tatively understood”, his reasons include the interest of its inventor William 
Crookes’ life and career, its history’s wealth in “accidental observations, 
lengthy and ingenious experimentation, and incorrect conclusion all lead-
ing to a not totally satisfying theory” and the ease with which it lends itself 
to experiments adaptable to di& erent audiences rendering it a very useful 
classroom tool.59 Draper’s arguments for giving attention to the Crookes 
radiometer show the breadth of play of the device and explain its particular 
suitability for the “playthinging” that I am putting forward in this article. 
56  “[comprehend, v.]” in: Oxford English Dictionary [online]. Second edition, 1989. 2012. 
Available at: <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37847> [cit. 7. 8. 2012]; “[understand, v.]” in:
Oxford English Dictionary [online]. Second edition, 1989. 2012. Available at: <http://www.oed.
com/view/Entry/212085> [cit. 7. 8. 2012].
57  Crookes names the moving part this way ! rst in William CROOKES, “On Repulsion 
Resulting from Radiation – Parts III. & IV.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London, vol. 166, 1876, p. 344 (325–376). See image 1.
58  Cli% on W. DRAPER, “# e Crookes Radiometer Revisited: A  Centennial Celebration.” 
Journal of Chemical Eductaion, vol. 53, 1976, no. 6, p. 356 (356–357).
59 Ibid., p. 356.
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Although I believe that the aspects that will be teased out through regard-
ing a device as a plaything are true of all artefacts, some devices, for non-
noumenal reasons, seem to show them in an extended way: they seem to 
be made to be transformed and seem particularly prone to fall in the gaps 
of classi" cation systems, to require and register paradigm shi# s that they 
outlive. $ e radiometer falls into this category, and that probably explains 
why it became a toy and is still widely available today.
Image 1: “Crookes Radiometer,” Image by Timeline for Wikipedia Commons [on-
line] 2005. Available at: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Crookes_radiometer.jpg> 
[cit. 2. 9. 2012].
A  good standard description of the device explains that, despite 
its name, it is a  demonstration device rather than a measuring instru-
ment, relates the way in which it grew out of its inventor’s recognition of 
an anomaly when weighing hot samples in vacuum, tells how its theory 
caused controversy from the time it was " rst presented in 1874 and how 
its operation is still considered complicated to this day, recounts some of 
the big names of science whose interest it attracted, describes the way in 
which Crookes’ investigation of its e% ects took him in a di% erent direction 
(generally described as erroneous) to his contemporaries and usually lists 
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the device’s contributions to the kinetic theory of gases and to the invention 
of the cathode ray tube.60
Such an account certainly points out the fascinating story of the device 
but, I would argue, does not capture the array of understanding that the 
device o" ers as a material object, the variation in its a" ordance to action and 
perception, which is to say its “play”. # inking of it as plaything however, 
as I will demonstrate below, leads to a more comprehensive account in these 
respects.
Restoring mobility
A plaything, as we’ve seen in Hodgkin’s account above, is recognised as such 
through the part it performs in the looping structure of play. It is a material 
object in constant oscillation along this loop, its nature varying in a recurrent 
semi-cycle. It seamlessly moves between the status of tool, toy and symbol, 
is both sensory and abstract and, rather than being de$ ned by its function, 
embraces change in its role, constitution and classi$ cation all the while still 
remaining itself. Considering a scienti$ c instrument as a plaything means, 
in the $ rst place, restoring its inherent mobility as an artefact.
Rather than de$ ning the instrument in terms of its function, it means 
opening it up to the various uses it has been put to, as well to others it might 
in the future be applied for, whether scienti$ c or not because all thoughtful 
engagements produce understanding.
In the case of the radiometer, this means that rather than de$ ning it 
as a demonstration instrument, which creates a phenomenon and provides 
working knowledge of it, we can also address its inventor’s intended function 
of it as a measuring instrument for radiation (whence its appellation radi-
ometer), regardless of it ful$ lling this function. It also allows us to look into 
the way it was hypothesised as a model: for action at a distance in Crookes’s 
$ rst interpretation of its behaviour as well as (a not particularly e" ective 
one) for the kinetic theory of gases in the accepted explanation of its work-
ings. It gives us access to the tacit know-how informed by its construction as 
perfected by Crookes and his assistant Charles Gimmingham, as well as to 
the objective information it o" ers that passes into the domain of scienti$ c 
60  Excellent examples of such an account are two articles by Norman R. HECKENBERG, 
“Radiometer, Crookes.” In: BUD, R.  – WARNER, D. J. (eds.), Instruments of Science: An
Historical Encyclopedia. London – New York: Science Museum & Smithsonian 1998, pp. 
510–511; and Norman R. HECKENBERG, “Crookes’ Radiometer and Otheoscope.” Bulletin
of the Scienti! c Instrument Society, no. 50, 1996, pp. 40–42.
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and technological knowledge proper. It also admits the subjective under-
standing it has o! ered at various times, including its relevance to Crookes’ 
spiritualist investigations into medium communication. In other words, 
considering the radiometer a plaything challenges the divisions, de# nitions 
and categorisations that would limit what is admitted as understanding in 
what the device has to o! er.
Sensitive and enquiring process
In 1873, Crookes was attempting to determine the atomic weight of $ al-
lium, the new element that he had discovered by use of the spectroscope. It 
was during these “very laborious researches” that he noted the odd behav-
iour of the warm samples that he was weighing in an evacuated chamber, 
and it was this recognition of an anomaly and the desire to stabilise its e! ect 
that lead to the making of the radiometer.
Noticing that something is behaving anomalously presupposes a  tacit 
knowledge of the context in which a phenomenon is encountered, that is 
an attentive sensitivity to the usual workings of a de# ned environment. It 
results from directed chance, borne out of a more or less de# ned course of 
investigation and necessitating skill and training in order to recognise the 
signi# cance of the chance encounter; in this case, the anomalous behaviour 
of heated bodies in vacuum. In Representing and Intervening, philosopher 
of science Ian Hacking suggests that even the most irrational looking 
course of inquiry can be a  tool of discovery. To the question: “must there 
be a conjecture under test in order for an experiment to make sense?” he 
answers: “I  think not.”61 What is however required are attentiveness, care
and practice, which provide the means of understanding and interpreting 
the e! ects produced. It is important that Crookes was aware of how things 
were meant to behave according to the scienti# c theories of the time and 
through his experimental experience. Had this not been the case, he would 
not have distinguished the phenomenon as anomalous. It is also essential 
that he recognised its meaningful potential. Without this informed curi-
osity, experimentation would not have taken place. $ e recognition of an 
anomaly in his study of $ allium led Crookes to look at ways of elaborating 
the striking e! ect that he believed would be of scienti# c signi# cance.
61 Ian HACKING, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of 
Natural Science. Cambridge – New York – Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 
p. 154.
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! is inductive process and its various contingencies are brought to the 
fore when one considers the device as a plaything: the sensitive and enquiring 
approach to the world that it entails is put forward, suggesting a hands-on 
and groping approach to understanding, the more embodied and immersed 
aspect of scienti# c inductive reasoning. To the enduring philosophical ques-
tion of whether it is theory or practice that comes # rst in scienti# c inquiry, 
the answer this method presents is an oscillation between the two, a recipro-
cal constitution of one through the other.
It also brings out the spatial nature of this kind of engagement when all 
paths are still possible and various options are tested; and helps identify the 
particular context for this searching activity, an experimental space which, 
like the privileged zone of play, has its own laws and is in a way extracted 
from everyday rules. Instruments in the making are like playthings as the 
things we think of in the absorption and open-ended intent that “playing” 
with them requires.
Evocative objects: things we think with
Instruments are evocative objects for their makers and users. In the 
case of the radiometer, this is made particularly clear through its inven-
tor adopting the instrument as a  symbol for his scienti# c researches and 
achievements. When the scientist was knighted in 1897, the most prominent 
icon in the design of his coat of arms (pictured below, image 2) is a depiction 
of the radiometer. His chosen motto inscribed on a scroll underneath it is 
“Ubi crux ibi lux,” which translates into: “Where the cross is, there is light.”
Although this line most obviously refers to the Maltese cross on his cathode 
ray which features twice at the upper corners of the design, his biographer 
William H. Brock also reads it as wordplay by the inventor: “Where Crookes 
is, there is light” – the light of knowledge provided by the radiometer, its 
whirling vanes representing “the black of scienti# c ignorance $ eeing from 
the white of a new understanding of fundamental physics.”62
A  1902 portrait of Crookes holding the radiometer # rmly in his le%  
hand while his right hand rests casually in his pocket further demonstrates 
the symbolic importance of the radiometer for its inventor (see image 3). 
! e fact that he chose to be represented with the device in his hand two 
decades a% er he # rst presented it is signi# cant. ! e image reveals something 
62 William H. BROCK, William Crookes (1832–1919) and the Commercialisation of Science. 
London: Ashgate 2008, p. 222.
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of the relationship between the instrument and its maker: Crookes seems 
con! dent in his handling of the object held up like a sword. It is the weapon 
that renders the world knowable and controllable by science, and it becomes 
an extension of the scientist’s body, assimilated by his everyday practice. 
Scientist and instrument appear bound in a seamless way by a narrative of 
knowledge and intellectual ascendance. In this narrative, the radiometer 
plays the part of the key to understanding the world.
          
Image 2 (le# ): “Sir William Crookes  (1832–1919)” in Escutcheons of Science – Armo-
rial of Scientists – Numericana [online]. Available at: <http://www.numericana.com/
arms/crookes.htm> [cit. 28. 6. 2009].
Image 3 (right): “Sir William Crookes (1832–1919)” from Vanity Fair, 1902, by “Spy” 
Sir Leslie WARD (1851–1922) [online]. Available at: <http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Sir_William_Crookes_1902.jpg> [cit. 16. 5. 2009].
A  tiny otheoscope mounted on a  tiepin that Crookes is said to have 
always worn plays a similar symbolic role. I found a reference to it in a letter 
to his son where he introduces this new variant of the radiometer under 
the ! rst name he had given it, “elaunoscope”, writing: “I have one about 
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½  inch in diameter mounted as a scarf pin.”63 I believe it is this accessory 
that I photographed in a small case at Blythe House (below, images 4 and 5). 
It can now be found in a case near the entrance of Royal Society’s Library in 
Carlton Terrace, London, along with most of Crookes’ radiometers, which 
he presented to the Royal Society in 1911.
         
Images 4 and 5: Photographs taken by the author at the Science Museum’s storage 
facility in Blythe House in April 2009.
Recognition of and reaction to a! ordances
As with playthings, what makes an instrument evocative is a result of 
the recognition of and reaction to the possibilities of action that it presents 
to its maker as well as to its users. # ey result from the a$ ordances of an 
object and/or environment to a scientist that appear useful to his or her in-
vestigative purposes. # e “actions of a demiurge” that lead to their making 
63 William CROOKES, “Letter to Henry,” quoted in E. E. FOURNIER D’ALBE,! e Life of Sir 
William Crookes. London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd. 1923, p. 261.
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consist of testing out, modelling with, and re! ning materials and phenom-
ena in particular circumstances for which they present themselves as useful. 
What an instrument o" ers to be done with it, as with a plaything, cannot 
be thought of as separate from the process of making it, from the skilled 
practice involving materials and techniques that leads to its emergence.
In “Showing, Doing and the Ontology of Using Scienti! c Instruments”, 
philosopher of science Denis L. Sepper proposes the following description 
for how an artefact becomes a scienti! c instrument:64
I would suggest that as a general principle that objects become scienti! c instru-
ments (or perhaps proto-instruments) when they display an e" ect of interest to 
researchers, i.e., within an already well-de! ned context of investigation. [...] If 
the e" ect is su$  ciently striking and if one also discovers that one can elaborate 
the e" ect and even do things with it, the object becomes a full-% edged process-
ing instrument.65
Sepper further notes that the transformation of an object into a process-
ing instrument a" ects the instrumental signi! cance of related objects and 
opens up the possibility of developing new compound and more complex 
instruments.66
Scienti! c instruments, then, come to be or, more accurately, are made, 
within particular contexts of investigation through their association with 
particular e" ects that are enrolled for action and interpretation in these 
contexts and that can subsequently extend beyond them. & inking of in-
struments as playthings brings these contexts, e" ects and negotiations to 
the fore. In that sense, it helps unravel what is referred to as “black-boxing” 
in the sociology of science: rather than considering instruments as input-
output devices that unproblematically transmit natural knowledge, it fa-
cilitates the aims of constructive approaches to the history of science which 
address scienti! c practices and socio-political and cultural contexts in order 
to unravel the social means through which particular experiments executed 
64  Dennis L. SEPPER, “Showing, Doing and the Ontology of Using Scienti! c Instruments.” 
In: DRAGONI, G. – McCONNELL, A. – TURNER, G. L’E. (eds.), Proceedings of the Eleventh 
International Scienti! c Instrument Symposium [Bologna University, 9–14 September, 1991]. 
Bologna: Gra! s Edizioni, 1994 (29–34).
65 Ibid., p. 30.
66 Ibid., pp. 31–32.
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by speci! c experimenters with speci! c instruments came to produce valid 
knowledge for particular audiences.67
Reverse black-boxing
In the case of the radiometer, this allows an elaboration on Crookes and 
Gimmingham’s experimental work towards stabilising the observed e" ects 
of repulsion resulting from radiation into an instrument “which had none 
of [the] defects [of previous arrangements], whilst it showed the movement 
of rotation in a very convenient matter”.68 It also allows for a discussion of 
the scienti! c context in which the device was presented, the controversy it 
caused in the interpretation of its e" ects, the various players involved in its 
scienti! c career and its eventual epistemic obsolescence. While the radiom-
eter ! rst caused sensation in the scienti! c community when it was presented 
at a Soirée of the Royal Society on April 7th 1875, especially because of its
promise of answers about the nature of light and radiation, critics of Crookes 
theory of its behaviour were quick to emerge. His positing of a pressure of 
radiation causing the vanes to rotate was criticised by Osborne Reynolds 
who convincingly argued that the movement of the radiometers’ vanes 
could be easily explained by the presence of residual gas in the evacuated 
chamber.69 Reynolds further referred to an experiment by Arthur Schuster, 
led at his instigation, which gave experimental evidence that “the Force 
which turns the Mill is not directly referable to Radiation”. $ is consisted in 
suspending a radiometer with two parallel ! bres and subjecting it to a light 
source. If external radiant light caused the repulsion then, because of the 
tiny amount of friction in the glass vessel, the whole instrument would turn 
in the same direction as the vanes. However if the forces were produced 
within the instrument, then the instrument would rotate in the opposite 
direction of the vanes in accordance with Newton’s third law of motion. 
$ e latter was observed and Schuster concluded that: “$ e motion in the 
light-mill is wholly due to the forces acting between the revolving mill and 
67  See Jan GOLINSKI, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998, p. 140, de! nition of “black-boxing”.
68  William CROOKES, “On Repulsion Resulting from Radiation. Parts III. & IV.” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, vol. 166, 1876, p. 339 (325–376).
69  Osborne REYNOLDS, “On the Forces Caused by the Communication of Heat between 
a  Surface and a Gas; And on a New Photometer.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London, vol. 166, 1876, p. 726 (725–735).
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its enclosure.”70 Based on the experiment, Reynolds proceeded with calcula-
tions that led to the explanation commonly held to this day.71 His notion
of “! ermal Transpiration” and Maxwell’s development on that theory 
eventually explained the radiometer e" ect as a  result of the di" erence in 
temperature between the two sides of the vane causing gas molecules at the 
edge to slide in such a way as to cause tangential stress on the vanes’ surface 
and thereby produce motion.72
Consequent theoretical researches on the behaviour of particles and on 
the properties of rare$ ed gas by all involved led to the progressive develop-
ment of a new molecular kinetic theory of gas, and pushed the radiometer 
away from the centre of attention as it became reduced to merely a context 
amongst others in which to test the new theory. By 1880, apart from a few 
sparse speculations, scientists seemed no longer concerned with the radiom-
eter itself, their attention now directed to the phenomena in rare$ ed gases 
that it had contributed to enlighten. 73
! ingness: materials and technologies
While such an unpacking of black-boxes is now common practice in ap-
proaches to the history of science and technology, the plaything methodol-
ogy adds a dimension that seems to be le%  out by such historiographies: 
they seem to overlook what the thing itself does outside of socio-political 
and scienti$ c discourses, to leave out what the instrument’s “thingness”, the 
materials and technologies at work in it, a" ord to perception, action and 
understanding.
70 ! is was later regarded as the “crucial experiment” on the radiometer. Arthur SCHUSTER, 
“On the Nature of the Force Producing the Motion of a  Body Exposed to Rays of Heat 
and Light.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, vol. 166, 1876, p. 718 
(715–724).
71  REYNOLDS, “On the Forces,” p. 730.
72 Osborne REYNOLDS, “On Certain Dimensional Properties of Matter in the Gaseous State,” 
Part I-II Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, vol. 170, 1879, pp. 727–845;
J. C. MAXWELL, “On Stresses in Rari$ ed Gases Arising from Inequalities of Temperature.” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, vol. 170, 1879, pp. 231–256.
73  It is worth noting that in 1924, Albert Einstein contributed additional explanation to the 
radiometer’s behaviour that was picked up by M. Knudsen who elaborated on it in 1930. ! e 
“Einstein e" ect” suggested an additional phenomenon at work in the radiometer: that of the 
excess pressure at the edges of the vane. ! is would be caused by gas molecules at the edge 
being held back both by molecules rebounding on the vane one side and, less e" ectively, by 
molecules passing the edge to the cooler side.
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! is attention to technology and materials in play may be the essential 
aspect that leads a consideration of scienti# c instruments into the realm of 
playthings. Scienti# c instruments are things made with skilful use of tech-
niques and materials (ahead of and informing form), and engagement with 
them foregrounds the a$ ordances of these in the exploration of the world. 
Moreover, these a$ ordances, by characterising the looping movement of 
playthings, are shown to vary over time: what particular materials and tech-
nologies o$ er to perception, action and understanding evolves with respect 
to context, circumstance and perceiver/actor/interpreter. I use the expression 
“historical a$ ordance” to refer to this notion which is the main argument for 
looking at the instruments of science and technology as playthings.
Historical a! ordance
Gibson’s theory of a$ ordance gives leeway for a variation in or evolution 
of the a$ ordance of an environment or a thing, because the ecological en-
vironment, as he presents it, is a blend of permanence and change, what he 
calls “discontinuous change” rather than “transformation” in order to set 
variance and invariance as reciprocals in describing the stable and changing 
relationships between self and world. A$ ordances, he tells us, are speci# ed 
in the relative invariants over transformations, and involve a  reciprocal 
process of attunement (as in active and progressive adjustment and equi-
libration towards harmony) between being and environment (“resonating” 
to one another), a dynamic reciprocity. Since relative ecological constants 
and a$ ordances that appear to have the quality of stability and permanence 
persist to the degree to which these constants persist, the invariance of an 
a$ ordance is just a matter of di$ ering time scales: what seems stable is just 
in a di$ erent regime of duration, it endures. A$ ordances, then, are always 
(semi-cyclically) historical. ! is “historical a$ ordance” of things that 
changes over time is the principal notion that this methodology aims to 
tease out.
By regarding scienti# c artefacts as playthings, the range of “play” in their 
a$ ordance is brought to the fore, and these variations in and evolution of 
their a$ ordances call for an historical approach to register them. A histori-
cal account can take into consideration the mobility and transformability of 
things while keeping the memory of their past a$ ordances and anticipating 
future ones, it can show that change is occurring yet in a continuous subsist-
ing thing. Just as borrowed or adapted terms conserve their prior layers of 
meaning, so artefacts retain a memory of their past a$ ordances; and just as 
Lina Hakim
223
terms o! er potential poetic uses inspired by earlier ones, so objects suggest 
further ways of deploying them that extend previous uses and practices. 
" ere is always time in things: they are chronic (rather than temporal) 
because they recurrently change and sometimes disobey what we think is 
characteristic of them. In order to take this into account, the methodology 
set out here approaches objects in a historical way, which is not to say that it 
does so chronologically: history is not considered as a linear progression and 
no such thing as precedence or a “more real” reality is posited. Like the loop-
ing structure of play, it is viewed as a semi-cyclical spatial movement rather 
than as a matter of succession: sometimes what happens latest in an object’s 
career is what seems more “primary” at the time and place of writing. No 
such thing as a “more primary” quality or characteristic or role of a thing is 
therefore posited or assumed, except in relation to a particular perspective/
context/etc. Although I will resort to using it in the text, this explains why 
“declination” is not quite the adequate term to describe what might appear 
to be the “other” lives of things: it implies that there is a “real” life and an 
order of precedence, whereas the plaything methodology considers that all 
manifestations of an object are valid.
By adopting this historiography, the varying a! ordances of artefacts are 
brought forward, and any suggestion of pattern or objectivity is understood 
as the result of a  regular recurrence or of repeatedly instantiated sets of 
relations. " e un$ xity, uncontainability and irreducibility of the artefacts 
considered thus foregrounded render them ideal for a “philosophical” and 
“elastic” understanding of things that is also involved in a thought about its 
own processes. Instead of stable information and de$ nition, scienti$ c in-
struments regarded as playthings o! er a lot of scope for “tuning in” to them 
as thinking things, with sometimes the reward of rare moments of “being 
in tune” with them: they become, in other words, ideal philosophical toys.
! e radiometer’s historical a" ordances
" e notion of historical a! ordance as I’ve described it above brings attention 
to the di! erent materials and technologies that compose the device as his-
tories, $ rst of each constitutive part separately and then of their particular 
arrangement and relationships within it.
In the case of the radiometer, this involves looking at the cultural history 
of glass, its a! ordance as a material and process, and the problems that its 
transparency and transitivity generate. Literary scholar Isobel Armstrong 
reminds us that 19th century glass was blown by artisans, which means that 
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in using it “you literally looked through, and by means of, somebody else’s 
breath.”74 She explains how as a consequence of its availability and ubiquity 
in the mid 1800s it came to participate in the formation of consciousness 
itself and suggests that the epistemological questions raised by glass at the 
time were about mediation, transitivity and their implications. " e dialectic 
of glass, at once letting through and blocking, or selectively doing one or the 
other, generated, she writes, “di# erent kinds of epistemological confusion 
out of the very lucidity of glass.”75 Transparency and mediation are at the
heart of this confusion: “Just as the artisan’s breath was invisible, so also was 
the fact of mediation, as the invisible shaped experience.”76
Attention to glass as substance and process allows us to problematise 
the radiometer’s glass enclosure in laboratory practice in terms of surfaces, 
membranes and boundaries. It also brings attention to technologies of con-
tainment, and leads us to the next material constitutive of the device: the 
vacuum (though later understood as partial) that it is a necessary vessel for.
" e radiometer was for the scientist James Clerk Maxwell $ rst and 
foremost a device that allowed, by means of a glass globe both impermeable 
and see-through, for the sealing and observation of vacuum, or at least of 
a condition or medium “much nearer to nothing” than had previously been 
achieved. 77
Interrogating vacuum, which only became an experimental object that 
could be made and manipulated in the late seventeenth century, opens up 
discussions about the hypothesised subtle medium called “ether” and its 
use as a  trope for natural philosophical investigations. It crucially allows 
us to look into its a# ordance to Crookes’ spiritualist investigations: this at-
tenuated environment held for him the possibility of revealing the e# ects of 
parapsychological transmissions, its conductive capability mirroring that of 
the sensitive mediums of nineteenth century séances – the radiometer, for 
Crookes, could render spiritual energy phenomenal.
74 Isobel ARMSTRONG, “Technology and Text: Glass Consciousness and Nineteenth-Century 
Culture.” In: FLINT, K. – MORPHY, H. (eds.), Culture, Landscape and Environment: ! e
Linacre Lectures 1997. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, p. 149 (149–175). See also Isobel 
ARMSTRONG, Victorian Glassworlds: Glass Culture and the Imagination. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2008.
75 Ibid., p. 149.
76 Ibid.
77  Letter from Maxwell to Robert Cay, 15 May 1876, quoted in S. G. BRUSH and C. W. F. 
EVERITT, “Maxwell, Osborne Reynolds, and the Radiometer.” In: MC CORMMACH, R. (ed.), 
Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, Volume 1. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press 1969, p. 112.
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It can then be studied as a device for explicating an environment where 
di" erent laws of nature operate, its magical potential heightened by the sug-
gestion of perpetual movement in the rotation of its vanes.
Artistic declinations
Furthermore, the plaything methodology allows us to look at artistic prac-
tices that put the instrument to use, bringing alternative a" ordances to view 
and suggesting future ones. Various artworks can be considered as material 
“declinations” of an instrument in a chain of connection that links objects 
to one another.78 An attention to artworks is particularly fruitful in uncover-
ing an object’s a" ordances outside of its designated function because of the 
way in which artists put things maximally to play in their investigations, 
processes and productions. # ree brief examples demonstrate how this is the 
case with the radiometer.
# e artist Francis Picabia’s 1913 watercolour Mechanical Expression 
Seen ! rough Our Own Mechanical Expression shows an abstracted radiom-
eter that he uses to represents the dancer Stacia Napierkowska.79 # e analogy 
puts forward the empathetic a" ordance of the radiometer’s performance, 
inversing the usual trope in his title so that it is human movement that 
promises to reveal the inner working of the device.
In Northern Lights, the novelist Philip Pullman alludes to the radiom-
eter when describing the magical e" ect of a scienti$ c instrument:
# en it became clear: a little thing like a weathervane, with four sails black on 
one side and white on the other, began to whirl around as the light struck it. It 
illustrated a moral lesson, the Intercessor explained, for the black of ignorance 
% ed from the light, whereas the wisdom of white rushed to embrace it.80
Pullman’s account puts forward the device’s resonance as a holy object and 
sheds light both on Crookes’ adoption of it as a  symbol of his epistemic 
virtue and on the reasons for which it seems to promise a link between the 
physical and the metaphysical.
78 # e word “declination” is taken from Christopher PINNEY, “# ings Happen: Or, From 
Which Moment Does # at Object Come?” In: MILLER, D. (ed.), Materiality. Durham – 
London: Duke University Press 2005 (256–272). In this article he suggests that networks of 
objects might o" er an alternative method of engaging with things.
79  Francis PICABIA, Mechanical Expression Seen through Our Own Mechanical Expression, 
watercolour and pencil on paper, 1913. New York, Collection Lydia Malbin.
80  Philip PULLMAN, Northern Lights. London: Scholastic 1995, p. 149.
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More recently, artist Luke Jerram’s chandeliers, made of hundreds of 
radiometers (665 for a 5m tall chandelier), multiply the device’s aesthetic 
e" ect in a spectacular demonstration of its # ickering play with light, bring 
forward the sensitivity of its responsiveness to environmental light and heat 
and seem to point to an in$ nity of atmospheric enclosures each contained 
in an ever larger one.81
While I cannot expand on these examples within the scope of this ar-
ticle, these brief sketches demonstrate how productive the study of artistic 
declinations of instruments can be. Once regarded as playthings, they are 
found to share the aesthetic inspiration of artworks that put them to play.
I  have elaborated in this article a  phenomenological/ecological un-
derstanding of the plaything in order to argue that considering scienti$ c 
instruments as playthings is a generative methodology that restores their 
mobility and inherent transformability, takes into account the skill required 
in making them as well as their historical a" ordances and allows for their 
consideration alongside objects from di" erent $ elds with which they reso-
nate. I hope that in doing so I have made a convincing case for reviving the 
category of philosophical toy in studies of science and technology.
81 Luke JERRAM, Chandeliers (undated). See project page on the artist’s website available at:
<http://www.lukejerram.com/projects/chandeliers> [cit. 13. 4. 2013].
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